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Abstract  
In the business context there is a broad spectrum of practices that potentially harm others, yet 
might benefit the organization. We examined the influence of individual and situational 
differences in predicting (un)ethical behaviour in these moral grey zones using an in-basket 
exercise that included covert moral issues in which managers could give unethical 
instructions to their followers. Results show that individual differences in moral 
disengagement directly predicted unethical behaviour and functioned as a mediator of the 
relationship between authenticity and unethical behaviour. Furthermore, effects differed in 
weak compared to strong situations. Study 2, replicated the results from Study 1, developed a 
direct test of the situational strength hypothesis, and showed that high versus low situation 
strength moderated the relation of moral disengagement to unethical behaviour.  
  
MORAL GREY ZONE  3 
Unethical behaviour carried out or tolerated by people in leadership positions is a 
central threat for organizations, their stakeholders, and society as a whole (Asforth, Goia, 
Robinson, & Treviño, 2008). Although there are surely unethical acts due to unethical 
motives or a lack of virtue, more recent approaches to explaining unethical behaviour in the 
corporate world argue that many influences make it difficult for managers to implement 
ethical practices in their daily enterprise (Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Schweitzer, Ordonez, & 
Douma, 2004; Treviño, Weaver, & Reynolds, 2006). Today it is widely accepted that these 
influences have their origins in the person and the situation (Kish-Gephart, Harrison, & 
Trevino, 2010; Moore & Gino, 2013), but knowledge and evidence are scarce regarding 
which individual differences are influential in these situations or how and when situational 
and individual factors interact. 
The current research addresses these issues. Drawing on social-cognitive theory of 
moral thought and action (Bandura, 1991, 1999), we propose that unethical managerial 
behaviour is more likely if managers disengage from processes related to moral conduct. 
Moral disengagement describes a conglomeration of self-regulatory processes that allow 
people to act unethical without feeling bad (Bandura, 1999). For example, in the process of 
moral justification, injurious actions are made personally and socially acceptable by 
portraying them as serving moral, social or organizational purposes. Although moral 
disengagement was originally introduced as a state, research shows that individual 
differences in self-related processes associated with moral disengagement influence the 
perception of moral issues and the tendency to translate moral intentions into moral 
behaviour (Jennings, Mitchell, & Hannah, 2014; Martin, Kish-Gephart, & Detert, 2014; 
Moore, Detert, Trevino, Baker, & Mayer, 2012).  
Aiming at further developing this promising stream of research, we introduce 
authenticity (i.e., an individual’s tendency to accurately represent – privately and publicly – 
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internal states, intentions, and commitments; Sheldon, 2004) as a potential antecedent of the 
propensity to morally disengage. We argue that the striving for self-understanding and 
consistent self-expression that characterize people high in authenticity (Harter, 2002) reduces 
their propensity to morally disengage, which in the end results in a lower tendency to engage 
in unethical behaviour. Thus, the research presented here provides further support for moral 
disengagement’s role as a predictor of unethical managerial behaviour but extends its scope 
by introducing moral disengagement as a process mediating between authenticity and 
unethical behavior. 
In linking authenticity, moral disengagement, and unethical behaviour, we further 
propose that the concept of moral disengagement can help clarify a controversy in research 
on moral leader behaviour. Following large-scale ethical failures in the business domain, 
leadership researchers emphasize authenticity as a central characteristic for moral leaders and 
managerial integrity (May, Chan, Hodges, & Avolio, 2003; Palanski & Yammarino, 2007). 
Others question whether authenticity is necessarily linked to morality but argue that 
authenticity is value-neutral (Algera & Lips-Wiersma, 2012; Shamir & Eilam, 2005). We 
suggest a way to integrate these seemingly contradictory positions. We propose that 
authenticity is linked to moral behaviour because it reduces people’s propensity to morally 
disengage, which in the end results in less unethical behaviour for authentic individuals. We 
test moral disengagements’ direct and mediating effects using an in-basket exercise (Petersen 
& Dietz, 2000, 2008) in which participants behaved in the role of a manager who gives orders 
to be implemented by his subordinates. This technique allowed us to disguise situations with 
moral implications among situations that were normal business tasks and were morally 
neutral.  
Analysis of results from our first study revealed that participants’ tendency to engage 
in unethical behaviour differed between situations, a finding we interpreted in terms of the 
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Situational Strength Hypothesis (Mischel, 1977). As the Situational Strength Hypothesis 
suggests, the influence of person characteristics differs depending on whether situations are 
weak or strong, being higher in weak situations. Although the assumption that specific 
situational factors moderate the effect of individual differences is established in the fields of 
personality and social psychology, and organizational behaviour, research that directly tests 
the situational strength hypothesis is scarce and nearly absent in the field of behavioural 
ethics. As Cooper and Withey (2009, p.64) argue, its acceptance “is based more on the 
plausibility of the hypothesis and sheer repetition than on any empirical evidence”. Thus, as 
Figure 1 shows, in a second study, we extend our original research model by including 
situational strength as an additional influence on ethical choices. 
In sum, we make four contributions to the literature. We examine whether individual 
differences in moral disengagement predict: (1) unethical manager behaviour using a subtle 
simulation study, (2) function as a mediator between authenticity and unethical behaviour; 
and (3) differ in their relation to moral behaviour in weak compared to strong situations; and 
(4) we develop a procedure to directly test the Situational Strength Hypothesis in ethics 
research instead of using proxies for situational strength. 
Unethical Behaviour in Organizations: A Moral Grey Zone Approach 
Although primarily concerned with profit maximization, business activities affect 
other people, organizations, and the wider social and physical environment, and therefore 
have broad ethical implications (Sen, 1997). If actions performed in the business context can 
harm others, then a moral issue is involved (Velasquez & Rostanowski, 1985), and the 
question arises as to whether these actions are ethical. However, evaluating the ethicality of 
actions has substantial difficulties in the business context (Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 
2008). Commonly held notions of ethicality such as doing no harm to others or acting in a 
socially responsible manner that is responsive to the needs of others (Aquino, Freeman, Reed, 
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Lim, & Felps, 2009) may be less applicable in a business context. External harm might be 
ethically justified if it is accompanied by effects that are highly valued. Moreover, some harm 
to individuals and organizations might even be inherent in the nature of market-oriented 
business as competitive pressures advance one individual or organization at the expense of 
others. Thus, decision-making and behaviour in the business context is confronted with 
multiple and sometimes competing standards of conduct and a diversity of options as to how 
one should attain these standards. Nevertheless, unethical behaviour in business can be 
defined in a way that retains practical and conceptual importance. We define unethical 
behaviour as  behaviour that give one person or organization an advantage that is not 
deserved or that cause harm to others in a way the aggrieved party does not deserve and 
would not find acceptable.  
Primo Levi (1986), when analysing the extreme ethical dilemmas of prisoners of Nazi 
concentration camps, introduced the term moral grey zone for a context that “possesses an 
incredibly complicated internal structure, and contains within itself enough to confuse our 
need to judge” (p. 27). As suggested by Anteby (2008), we think the concept of a moral grey 
zone can inform thinking about ethical behaviour in business organizations. Oriented at 
Anteby’s use of the concept and recent research on the role of ambiguity in the occurrence of 
unethical behaviour (see Moore & Gino, 2013; Tenbrunsel & Smith-Crowe, 2008, for 
reviews), we defined moral grey zones as situations that are morally ambiguous and in which 
leaders and followers together engage in practices that are likely to harm others, yet might 
benefit the organization, the follower, or the leader. Our research focuses on the leader’s part 
in creating such a moral grey zone in a way that the leader could give unethical instructions 
to his or her followers. 
Study 1 
Several approaches suggest that acting ethically need not be explicitly motivated, but 
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rather, that moral notions are an inherent aspect of people’s self-understanding (Bandura, 
1991; Blasi, 1983; Haidt & Kesebir, 2010). Research shows that, for example, infants are 
born with at least rudiments of intuitive ethics processes, having an innate and early emerging 
moral-perceptual system that creates negative affect towards harmdoers (e.g., Haidt & 
Kesebir, 2010; Hamlin, Wynn, & Bloom, 2007). Societies nurture ethical behaviour as 
explained, for example, in Bandura’s (1991) social-cognitive theory of moral thought and 
action. According to Bandura, people construct moral standards in the course of socialization 
from diverse sources of influences such as education, evaluative social reactions to one’s 
conduct, and exposure to the self-evaluative standards modelled by others or in mass media. 
They use these personal standards as guides for positive self-sanctions (i.e., they cause 
satisfaction and build a sense of self-worth) if one’s actions conform to one’s moral 
standards; alternatively negative self-sanctions occur if one’s actions violate one’s moral 
standards. As a consequence, a deeply rooted aim to avoid harming someone who does not 
deserve such treatment becomes part of most individual’s self-standards, having origins as we 
noted in the innate responses of infants, and being reinforced by many social processes. 
Because of its centrality to the self, this norm may be used implicitly without careful 
consideration. Thus, it is most appropriate to examine ethical behaviour using situational tests 
rather than asking subjects to directly evaluate the ethicality of a given situation. It may also 
be necessary to understand the role of the self in such situational actions. 
Moral Disengagement 
According to the social-cognitive theory of moral thought and action, unethical acts 
such as harming others or arranging unjust distributions often require processes that 
disengage several processes related to self-regulation of moral behaviour (Bandura, 1999). 
This argument is in line with considerable research that documents the vital role of the self in 
an individual’s moral agency (Jennings et al., 2014) and the role of leader self-concepts for 
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moral leader behaviour (May et al., 2003; Palanski & Yammarino, 2007). One central finding 
is that reduction of self-referent processes such as self-awareness, self-organizing, and self-
regulatory processes increases an individuals’ tendency to conduct unethical acts (Bandura, 
1999; Gino, Schweitzer, Mead, & Ariely, 2011). Moral disengagement (Bandura, 1999) has 
received considerable research attention as an umbrella term that synthesizes a number of 
situational induced processes that predispose people to deviate from their standards and enact 
unethical behaviour (see Martin et al., 2014, for a recent overview). They do so when they a) 
reconstruct an action so that it is not viewed as being immoral, b) reduce their sense of 
agency by minimizing their role in a situation, c) fail to see the consequences that result from 
an action or inaction, and/or d) change how the victims of the action are regarded.  
Recently, moral disengagement has been introduced as a personal characteristic 
(Moore et al., 2012) suggesting that people differ in their propensity to morally disengage. 
This research is particularly interesting for understanding unethical behaviour of managers as 
they, given the nature of their work role, might be especially prone to succumb to factors that 
reduce self-referent processes (Bazerman & Gino, 2012; Josten, van Dijke, van Hiel, & 
DeCremer, 2014). Moreover, their behaviour has implications for their followers either via 
direct order or social learning processes. Against this background, a higher propensity to 
morally disengage could increase managers’ tendency to engage in unethical behaviours as 
moral disengagement may inhibit them from noticing the moral content of a situation and 
provide managers with excuses which allow them to circumvent self-sanctions. Thus, we 
expect: 
Hypothesis 1: The propensity to morally disengage is positively related to amount of 
unethical behaviour. 
Authenticity 
Although some research already established the relevance of moral disengagement to 
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(un)ethical leadership (e.g., Liu, Lam, & Loi, 2012), a concept that received considerable 
more attention as an attribute of moral leaders is authenticity (May et al., 2003; Palanski & 
Yammarino, 2007). This link between authenticity and morality, however, has been 
questioned by researchers referring to the conceptual roots of authenticity which are self-
knowledge and self-consistent expression (Harter, 2002; see Algera & Lips-Wiersma, 2012, 
for a discussion of the relationship between authentic leadership and ethicality). We argue 
that self-knowledge and consistent self-expression are not necessarily related to moral 
behavior, however, they may facilitate or inhibit processes that influence the occurrence of 
(im)moral behavior. More specifically, we argue that considering moral disengagement might 
help clarifying the relationship between authenticity and moral behavior and contribute some 
evidence to the mainly conceptual controversy in authentic leadership research.  
Given that people differ with regard to the role morality plays in their self-concept 
(Aquino & Reed, 2002), it seems plausible that authenticity need not always be linked to 
moral behaviour. However, because authentic functioning involves motivated self-awareness 
and consistent self-expression, and also because prior research links authenticity to lower 
defensiveness, ego-involvement, and non-contingent self-esteem (see Heppner & Kernis, 
2007; Kernis & Goldman, 2006, for reviews); it seems plausible that authenticity may 
decrease managers’ tendency to morally disengage. Consequently, authenticity may have an 
indirect effect on unethical behaviour operating through moral disengagement.  
Authenticity is supposed to be comprised of two facets: 1) a self-oriented facet that 
includes a high motivation to understand one’s thoughts and feelings, an awareness of self-
relevant information, and the aim to integrate different self-aspects in a coherent whole; and 
2) an expression-oriented facet that is indicated by a motivation to express the self in a 
consistent way (Knoll, Meyer, Kroemer, & Schroeder-Abé, 2015; see Gardner, Avolio, 
Luthans, May, & Walumbwa, 2005 for a similar model of authentic leadership). High values 
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in self-awareness and integration may shield against distractions that lead to unethical 
behaviour via moral disengagement. Self-awareness makes personal standards salient, and 
thus individuals are less likely to be engulfed by competing standards that are made salient by 
the situation (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975) which may facilitate moral disengagement. 
Self-integrity, in turn, should keep different parts of the identity salient and thus works 
against possible excuses when one domain of the self is dominant while another is seen as 
less relevant in a specific situation (Leavitt, Reynolds, Barnes, Schilpzand, & Hannah, 2012). 
The motive to maintain self-consistency and commitment to one’s intentions even when 
facing obstacles – which is captured in the expression-oriented facet of authenticity – has 
been argued to be a central explanation for the implementation of moral intentions (Bergman, 
2002; Blasi, 1980; Nucci, 2004). Therefore, it should decrease moral disengagement 
processes such as diffusion and displacement of responsibility. 
Furthermore, moral disengagement is more likely to occur when individuals are 
motivated to preserve a positive self-image or resolve cognitive dissonance emerging from 
behaviours that violate self- or societal standards (Bandura, 1999; Martin et al., 2014). 
Research that established the link between authenticity and non-contingent self-esteem 
showed that individuals high on authenticity are less vulnerable to self-esteem challenges and 
thus have a lower tendency to engage in self-protective and self-enhancing strategies that 
protect against threat (see Heppner & Kernis, 2007, for a discussion). Moral disengagement 
processes such as moral justification can be seen as such strategies. Finally, people who give 
themselves or their group or organization an advantage that is not deserved may experience 
the need to justify their behaviour through moral disengagement. This need should be lower 
for people high on authenticity as these also score high on the honesty/humility dimension of 
the HEXACO personality scale (Maltby, Wood, Day, & Pinto, 2012).  
In sum, as shown in Figure 1, we argue that processes that are associated with 
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authenticity such as the desire to express the self consistently, higher self-awareness, a lower 
tendency to engage in self-defensive cognitions and behaviour, decrease the likelihood of 
moral disengagement, which in the end result in less unethical behaviour. 
Hypothesis 2: The propensity to morally disengage mediates the relationship between 
authenticity and unethical behaviour. 
Method 
Procedure 
We examined the influence of individual differences in moral disengagement and 
authenticity on unethical behaviour using an in-basket exercise that is often used in 
Assessment Centers for management positions and which is, therefore, expected to have high 
external validity (Bartol & Martin, 1990). As in-basket exercises consist of a number of 
managerial tasks, this technique allows for a subtle examination of decisions with moral 
implications along with decisions without such qualities (Petersen & Dietz, 2000, 2008). 
Further, this technique allows examining unethical behaviours of different clarity and 
consequences without an obvious focus on morality in the study. 
In the in-basket exercise that we used, participants adopted the role of a manager of a 
fast-food chain. The first section of the in-basket exercise contained information about the 
structure of the company and a particular manager’s responsibilities. Then, the manager had 
to decide how to proceed in eight situations, and it was indicated that his direct reports or his 
assistant would act upon these decisions. For every situation, two or three possible answers 
were given and the participants had to choose one alternative. Four of the situations did not 
contain moral issues (e.g., approval for an application to take leave) and, therefore, were used 
as filler tasks. The tasks of interest for the present study were four situations that represented 
moral issues as one of the response options was an unethical behaviour, meaning that when 
choosing this option, the consequences will harm one or more other people (Velasquez & 
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Rostankowski, 1985). The four situations were as follows:  
In Situation 1, the manager was confronted with the problem that the company was 
too late to obtain a preferred exhibition booth. The response option that included a moral 
issue was that they could ask a follower to make a back-door arrangement with his 
acquaintance in the distribution committee. The ethical option was to accept the failure and 
not to give someone else a disadvantage. In Situation 2, participants had to decide whether or 
not to correct the widespread underpayment of staff. The manager could increase the salary to 
common standard, increase it to some extent or leave it as it is. Choosing a partial increase or 
no increase at all represented unethical behaviour as this behaviour is to the disadvantage of 
staff despite them being entitled to higher salary. In Situation 3, the manager had to decide on 
a typical salary for a new employee who, in her job interview, asked for a salary that was 
substantially below the company standard for the respective position. The manager could 
choose between granting the typical salary, granting the requested salary, or granting a salary 
between the two previous options. Only the first option represented ethical behaviour as the 
other options exploit the applicant’s inexperience in order to deny a legitimate salary. In 
Situation 4, the manager could agree to an incorrect posting of an accounting transaction in a 
prior quarter although the transaction was not finished yet. The ethical response was to refuse 
to do so and post the transaction in the later quarter.  
Participants 
The sample was comprised of 213 employees (84% female) with a mean age of 32.8 
years (SD = 9.0; Range = 17 to 62). Participants were employees enrolled in a distance 
education psychology program at a German university. They took part in partial fulfillment of 
course requirements. Thirty-one per cent of the employees worked in small organizations of 
up to 20 employees, 34% worked in middle-size organizations of 21-500 employees, 23% 
worked in bigger organizations of 501-10,000 employees, and 12% worked in large 
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organizations of more than 10,000 employees. Seventy-two per cent held entry-level 
positions, 15% were lower management, and 13% were at middle or higher levels of 
management. Different branches were represented in the sample, most of which were social 
and health care (24%), education (15%), trade and distribution (9%), industry (9%), 
administration (8%), and other services (20%). 
Measures 
Unless noted otherwise, participants responded to all survey items on seven-point 
scales with response anchors ranging from 1 (does not apply to me at all) to 7 (does apply to 
me entirely). All items were in German.  
Moral disengagement was measured with Moore et al.’s (2012) Propensity to Morally 
Disengage scale. The scale assesses eight forms of moral disengagement with one item each. 
For example, diffusion of responsibility is measured with the item “People can’t be blamed 
for doing things that are technically wrong when all their friends are doing it too.” Moore et 
al. suggest aggregating the scores on the eight items to form a comprehensive score. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .78. 
Authenticity was measured with the Integrated Authenticity Scale (IAS; Knoll et al., 
2015). The IAS comprises eight items to assess the self- (e.g., “I understand well why I 
behave like I do”) and the expression-oriented dimension (e.g., “I always stand by what I 
believe in”) of authenticity which were adapted from the Authenticity Inventory 3 (Kernis & 
Goldman, 2006) and from the Authenticity Scale (Wood, Linley, Maltby, Baliousis, & 
Joseph, 2008). Knoll and van Dick (2013) used the scale in a study on employee silence, and 
it showed good psychometric properties (factor structure, alpha reliabilities, and stability). 
Cronbach’s alpha was .81.  
(Un)ethical behaviour was measured by the number of unethical options selected by 
the participants in the in-basket exercise.  
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Results 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of all study variables are presented in Table 1. 
On average, across the four situations with moral implications, participants selected 1.99 (SD 
= 0.89) unethical behaviours. The distribution among the participants was: no unethical 
option chosen: 4%, one unethical option: 24%, two unethical options: 47%, three unethical 
options: 21%, four unethical options: 5%. Thus, distribution among participants approximates 
a normal curve.  
As can be seen in Table 1, moral disengagement was positively related to amount of 
unethical behaviour across the four situations with moral implications (r = .19, p < .01) fully 
supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 predicted that moral disengagement would mediate 
the relationship between authenticity and unethical behaviour. To test this mediating effect, 
structural equation modeling (SEM) was performed using Mplus (v. 7.2, Muthen & Muthen, 
2008-2014). As shown in Figure 2, we found an indirect effect from authenticity to unethical 
behaviour via moral disengagement, β = -.05, SE = .03, p = .03. In addition to using the Sobel 
test, we looked at the bootstrap (1000 iterations) confidence intervals to see whether 
conclusions would change. Results showed that the true indirect effect is 95% likely to range 
from -.12 to -.02 – the estimated effect was -.07. As zero does not occur between the lower 
and the upper boundary, we can conclude that the indirect effect for this mediator is 
significant. Thus, Hypothesis 2 was supported. 
Post-hoc analyses and situational strength hypothesis 
When analyzing the distribution of unethical behaviour choices in the four situations 
that contained a moral issue, we noticed that the tendency of participants to choose the 
unethical option was much lower for the fourth situation than for the other three. The mean 
value (0 = unethical choice, 1 = ethical choice) for the fourth item was 0.14 (SD = 0.35), 
whereas the average mean of the three other items was 0.62 (SD = 0.26). Paired sample t tests 
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confirmed that the difference between the two means was significant, t(212) = 17.17, p < .01.  
A possible theoretical explanation for this finding can be found in the Situational 
Strength Hypothesis (Mischel, 1977; see Cooper & Whitey, 2009, for a recent review) that 
proposes that behavioural variability is restricted if specific situational characteristics are 
present, namely if a situation is strong. Strong situations “lead everyone to construe the 
particular events the same way, induce uniform expectancies regarding the most appropriate 
response pattern, provide adequate incentives for the performance of that response pattern, 
and require skills that everyone has to the same extent” (Mischel, 1977, p.347). Weak 
situations, in turn, neither constrain options nor do they provide clear signals concerning 
desired or expected behaviour. According to the Situational Strength Hypothesis, laws and 
explicit and widely accepted norms should channel almost everyone into legal/moral 
behavior (Cooper & Whitey, 2009); whereas in weak situations, personal factors are more 
likely to be influential. In our study, the unethical option in Situation 4 was also illegal 
whereas the unethical options in Situations 1 to 3 were not illegal pointing at the possibility 
that Situation 4 is a strong situation whereas Situations 1 to 3 are weak situations. 
In order to test whether the influence of personal factors is lower in strong situations 
than in weak situations, we analyzed the relationships predicted in Hypotheses 1 and 2 
separately for the weak and the strong situations. As can be seen in Table 1, moral 
disengagement was still related to unethical behaviour when assessed through the three 
supposedly weak situations (r = .19, p < .01). In contrast, moral disengagement was not 
related to unethical behaviour in the strong situation (r = .06, p = .39). SEM results revealed 
that the indirect effect from authenticity to unethical behaviour via moral disengagement 
remained at a comparable level for the three weak situations (β = -.05, SE = .03, p = .03), but 
disappeared when the strong situation was used as dependent variable (β = -.02, SE = .02, p = 
.52). Thus, the direct and mediating effect of moral disengagement (Hypotheses 1 and 2) was 
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found in weak situations only.  
Discussion 
Results supported our hypotheses regarding moral disengagement as a predictor of 
unethical behaviour and as a mediator of the relationship between authenticity and unethical 
behaviour. Although the moral issues were interspersed throughout a more extensive in-
basket exercise, additional analyses revealed situational differences regarding the predictive 
power of the individual difference measures. We applied the Situational Strength Hypothesis 
as a possible explanation.  
Although the results are provocative, our interpretations are subject to several 
limitations. One is that we did not directly measure situational strength but our judgments of 
strong and weak situations were based on a proxy that was the application of legal principles 
and accounting rules, and the meaning of these distinctions to subjects were not empirically 
investigated. Another is that there was an imbalance with only one strong versus three weak 
situational stimuli. Finally, we could not directly test the proposed moderating effect of 
situational strength which would suggest that processes of moral disengagement are relevant 
in weak, but not in strong, situations. Therefore, we conducted a second study to replicate our 
findings and address these limitations. 
Study 2 
Study 2 was designed to replicate the results achieved in Study 1, address its 
limitations, and develop a direct test of situation strength. We then used this measure to 
examine whether situational strength moderates the influence of moral disengagement on 
unethical behaviour. 
To reach our first aim, we used the same procedure as in Study 1 and expect to find a 
direct effect of moral disengagement on unethical behaviour (Hypothesis 1) and that moral 
disengagement mediates the relationship between authenticity and unethical behaviour 
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(Hypothesis 2). In our interpretation of the differences in unethical choices in the four 
situations included in Study 1, we argued that Situations 1 to 3 represent weak situations, 
whereas Situation 4 represents a strong situation. To more thoroughly test this interpretation 
in this second study, we asked participants to rate the four situations according to the four 
criteria of situational strength as introduced in Mischel’s (1977) conceptual framework (see 
Measures section for details). The reliability of our use of the Situational Strength Hypothesis 
to interpret the post-hoc findings from Study 1 was also limited by the imbalance of three 
weak vs. one strong situation. To address this limitation, we included three additional moral 
issues in the in-basket exercise and hoped that at least two of them would score high on the 
situational strength measure. A balanced measure of three strong and three weak situations 
would then allow for a direct test of the Situational Strength Hypothesis. 
As explained in the additional analyses of Study 1, the Situational Strength 
Hypothesis proposes that strong situations reflect consensus in construal, expectancies for 
response patterns, adequate incentives for this pattern of responses and, skills that are 
uniform across a sample (Mischel, 1977). Strong situations restrict behavioural variability 
and thus reduce the relevance of person characteristics for predicting behaviour (Cooper & 
Withey, 2009; Mischel, 1977). Weak situations, in contrast, lack strong signals for 
appropriate behaviour; they give room for individual reasoning which, in turn, increases a) 
behavioural variability across actors, and b) permits individual differences to relate to other 
variables. As a first test of the usefulness of the Situational Strength Hypothesis in the 
domain of unethical behaviour, we aim to replicate post-hoc findings from Study 1 with a 
more balanced set of items and expect: 
Hypothesis 3: Situational strength moderates the direct and mediating effects of moral 
disengagement (measured as the propensity to morally disengage) on unethical behaviour; 
these effects will occur in weak but not in strong situations.  
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Method 
Participants 
The sample comprised of 231 participants (72% female) with a mean age of 31.6 
years (SD = 8.9; Range = 20 to 64). One-hundred and forty-two participants were employed, 
35 were self-employed, and 54 were not employed at the time of the study. The sample was 
similar to the sample in Study 1 in relevant characteristics. Participants were enrolled in a 
distance education psychology program at a German university and took part in partial 
fulfillment of course requirements.  
Procedure  
We used the same in-basket exercise as in Study 1. However, it was modified so that 
we presented eleven situations to the participants to achieve a more balanced set of weak and 
strong situations. Seven situations comprised a moral issue whereas four situations were used 
as filler tasks. The filler tasks and four of the moral issues were taken from Study 1. In brief, 
the three new situations were as follows: Situation 5: Giving versus withholding unfavourable 
facts in a report to the executive board of the company in the process of an acquisition; 
Situation 6: After being informed that taxes of some branches have not been paid and that this 
has not yet been discovered by officials, the manager decides whether to get in contact with 
officials and pay taxes, do nothing at the moment, or suggesting that employees prepare a 
plan to dispose of the branches; Situation 7: After being informed that the milk received from 
one supplier had likely been contaminated, the manager decides whether to take the milk 
from the market in advance of conclusive information or to wait till more information is 
available and to only take milk off the market if necessary. 
Measures 
We used the same measures for moral disengagement and authenticity, as in Study 1. 
Cronbach’s alpha was .69 for moral disengagement and .83 for authenticity. 
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Situational strength was measured with the four items Cooper and Withey (2009) 
suggested as criteria based on Mischel’s (1977) conceptual framework. Specifically, we 
asked participants to rate all eleven situations according to the criteria of: common construal 
(item: “Almost everyone would interpret this situation in the same way.”), uniform 
expectancies (“Almost everyone would agree on how to respond to this situation.”), adequate 
incentives ("If you had to decide how to respond to this situation in a manager AC, would 
you know which response will be judged positively and which negatively by the judges?”), 
and requisite skills (“Almost everyone has the ability to make the right decision in this 
situation.”). The aggregated score of the four criteria represents a measure for situational 
strength for each situation. Internal consistency was acceptable with Cronbach’s α’s ≥.70 for 
10 out of 11 situations. Participants also rated whether each situation contained a moral issue 
(ethical norm violation) and whether one of the response options of each item could interfere 
with the law. 
Unethical behaviour was measured as the number of unethical responses that 
participants choose in the seven situations that comprised a moral issue. 
Results 
Descriptive data on the seven situations that contained moral issues are presented in 
Table 2. For each situation, column 2 shows participants’ ratings of whether a violation of 
ethical norms occurred. In line with our intention, ratings for the seven situations that were 
supposed to represent moral issues were all substantially higher compared to the 
corresponding ratings of the four filler tasks, which showed ratings of 2.14 (SD = 1.69), 3.00 
(1.95), 3.25 (2.03), and 3.37 (2.06). As shown in column 3, Situation 4 that was assumed to 
represent a breach of the law in Study 1 was rated as more likely containing a response option 
that might break the law than the other three situations from Study 1 (Moral Issues 1-3). 
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Situational strength measure and confirmation of Study 1’s post-hoc categorizations 
As shown in the fourth column of Table 2, the situational strength scores for the seven 
situations that represented moral issues varied considerably indicating that the measure is 
sensitive to distinguish between strong and weak situations in the moral domain. Out of the 
four moral issue situations that were included in Study 1 (i.e., Situation 1 to 4), Situation 4 
received higher scores on the situational strength measure compared to the three other items 
suggesting that Situation 4 represents a strong situation. A paired sample t test comparing the 
situational strength of Situation 4 with the mean of the measures of Situations 1, 2, and 3 
supported our assumptions made in Study 1, t(225) = -3.481, p < .01. 
To achieve a more balanced measure for situational strength, we extended the in-
basket exercise by three newly created situations. We hoped that at least two of the newly 
created situations would complement Situation 4 to produce a balanced measure of three 
strong and three weak situations. We conducted an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) to 
examine whether the situations loaded on different factors based on situational strength 
ratings. A first EFA using the extraction criterion Eigenvalue > 1 suggested only one factor 
(factor loadings 3.27, 0.88, 0.77…), which explained 39% of the variance. This was 
interpreted as indicating that all situations reflect a moral issue, as desired. We then 
conducted a second EFA in which we forced the extraction of two factors, using a Promax 
(oblique) rotation.  
As shown in Table 3, the resulting pattern matrix showed that Situations 5, 4, and 7 
had their highest loadings on Factor 1 while Situations 2, 6, 3, and 1 had highest loadings on 
Factor 2. Considering the scores on the situational strength measure (see column 4 in Table 
2), we interpreted Factor 1 as a ‘strong situation’ and Factor 2 as a ‘weak situation’ 
dimension. Based on this, ethical behaviour scores from Situations 4, 5, and 7 were combined 
to create a strong situation measure, and scores from Situations 1, 2, and 3 were similarly 
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combined to create a weak situation measure. (The score from Situation 6 was not used as we 
wanted to create a balanced measure, and Situation 6 showed relatively high cross-loadings 
and nearly identical loadings on both factors. In addition, using the same three situations to 
represent weak situations as in Study 1 (i.e., Situation 1, 2, and 3) increased comparability of 
the results.) A paired sample t test revealed that the mean situational strength score of the 
three weak situations (M = 4.08, SD = 0.81), aggregated to a single measure, differed from 
the mean score of the three strong situations (M = 4.57, SD = 1.04), t(226) = -7.948, p < .01. 
Hypothesis testing 
Descriptive statistics and correlations of all study variables are presented in Table 1, 
and results from structural equation modeling are presented in Figures 2 and 3. As can be 
seen in Table 1, in line with Hypothesis 1, moral disengagement was positively related to the 
composite measure of unethical behaviour (consisting of seven situations), r = .29, p < .01. 
As can be seen in Figure 2, in line with Hypothesis 2, structural equation modeling revealed 
an indirect effect of authenticity to unethical behaviour via moral disengagement, β = -.07, SE 
= .02, p < .01. Notably, as shown in Table 1, moral disengagement was negatively related to 
perceived ethical norm violation, a measure that we created to check whether participants 
experienced the moral issues as such (which was supported by the higher scores on that 
measure of the seven moral issues compared to the four filler tasks as reported above), 
indicating that individuals high on moral disengagement are less sensitive with regarding to 
moral issues. Individuals high on authenticity showed higher sensitivity to ethical norm 
violations, however, this effect was significant in strong situations, only. 
Deriving from Study 1 results and post-hoc interpretations, Hypothesis 3 predicted 
that the direct effects of moral disengagement, and thus the effects of authenticity mediated 
through moral disengagement, should hold for weak but not for strong situations. To test for 
these moderated effects, we modified our model so that there were two separate dependent 
MORAL GREY ZONE  22 
variables representing unethical behavior in weak and in strong situations, as shown in Figure 
3. This allowed for a test of within-person moderation by situation strength, using the 
aggregate values of unethical behaviour in Situations 1, 2, and 3 as measure for unethical 
behaviour in weak situations and the aggregate value of unethical behaviour in Situations 4, 
5, and 7 as measure for unethical behaviour in strong situations, as previously described.  
To test for moderation, we estimated and compared the fits of two structural equation 
models (Ritter & Lord, 2011). Model 0 constrained the two paths from moral disengagement 
to unethical behaviour in weak and in strong situations to be equal, whereas Model 1 allowed 
these two paths to be estimated freely (thus allowing them to potentially differ in value). We 
used χ2 difference test to compare the fit of these two models. Results support Hypothesis 3, 
as the constrained model fit significantly worse than the free model, Δχ2diff = 10.236, df = 1, p 
= .001.  
Furthermore, our theoretical argument proposed that effects should be stronger for 
weak than for strong situations. As can be seen in Figure 3, in line with Hypothesis 3, the 
path from moral disengagement to unethical behaviour was significant for weak situations, β 
= .29, p < .05, but not significant for strong situations, β = .05, p = n.s. Results also differed 
between weak and strong situations for the indirect effects from authenticity to unethical 
behaviours via moral disengagement. We found a significant indirect effect for the weak 
situations, β = -.07, SD = .03, p = .01, but not for the strong situations, β = -.01, SD = .02, p = 
.50. These analyses were also repeated using bootstrapped confidence intervals (1000 
iterations), and conclusions remained the same. For weak situations, the 95% confidence 
interval for the indirect effect did not include zero 95% CI [-.15, -.03], but it included zero for 
the strong situations, 95% CI [-.05, .02]. Finally, as another indicator for the greater relevance 
of individual differences for explaining behaviour in weak compared to strong situations, the 
amount of explained variance in the model was greater for unethical behaviour in weak 
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situations (R
2
 = .08) than in strong situations (R
2
 = .02).  
In sum, Study 2 results replicated findings from Study 1 with an extended set of moral 
issues as dependent variable. Importantly, these results also confirmed the post-hoc 
interpretations we suggested in Study 1 regarding the assignment of the different situations. 
Moreover, Study 2 further illustrated the potential use of situational strength as a moderator 
variable that predicted when individual differences were related to unethical behaviour. In 
line with results from Study 1, individual differences in moral disengagement emerged as a 
significant predictor of unethical behaviour and mediated the relationship between 
authenticity and unethical behaviour in weak situations, but not in strong situations.   
General Discussion 
Results from two studies provide evidence that individual differences in moral 
disengagement increase the tendency to engage in unethical behaviour as measured by a 
subtle criterion (i.e., a manager’s advice to behave unethical as assessed in an in-basket 
exercise). In Study 1 and in Study 2, moral disengagement also functions as mediator 
between authenticity and unethical behaviour. We further applied the Situational Strength 
Hypothesis (Mischel, 1977) to examine unethical behaviour in the business context which we 
argue takes the form of a moral grey zone – situations that are morally ambiguous and in 
which leaders and followers together engage in practices that potentially harm others, yet 
might benefit the organization, the follower, or the leader. While we merely used it as a post-
hoc explanation for Study 1 findings (i.e., a situation-contingent tendency of a leader to 
demand unethical behaviours from his followers); in Study 2, we directly tested hypotheses 
based upon Mischel’s theoretical framework and used a scale that we developed based on 
Cooper and Withey’s (2009) suggestions. Results using structural equation modeling indicate 
that the Situational Strength Hypothesis might be a fruitful approach to increase our 
understanding of leader behaviour in a moral grey zone. Our results show consistently over 
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both studies that when situations are strong and, thus individuals perceive signals about 
which behaviour is appropriate in that particular situation, individual differences in moral 
disengagement do not influence unethical behaviour. When situations are weak, in contrast, 
individual differences in moral disengagement are likely to predict unethical behaviour and 
function as a mediator between authenticity and unethical behaviour. 
Implications 
Our research supports approaches that conceptualize unethical behaviour as a function 
of personal and situational factors (e.g., Kish-Gephart et al., 2010; Moore & Gino, 2013) and 
extends understanding of how these factors’ effects might be integrated. With regard to the 
influence of personal factors, our research shows that individual differences in moral 
disengagement predict unethical behaviour but, at the same time, that these effects depend on 
the nature of the situation. This is similar to Reynolds and Ceranic’ (2007) finding that the 
effects of moral judgement and moral identity on moral behaviour were higher in situations 
of low social consensus (i.e., the extent to which there is a general concurrence within society 
about the moral status of the issue). This is not surprising because our situational strength 
measures included consensus judgments. However, the situational strength approach is 
broader, integrating social consensus and other cues such as laws or norms of proper conduct 
that make the person perceive particular behaviours as appropriate in particular situations. 
The measure for the estimation of the strength of situations that we validated based on 
Mischel’s (1977) theoretical framework and Cooper and Withey’s (2009) items, seems to be 
useful for further research on these topics. 
One implication of our (and related) research is that strong situations might inhibit the 
relevance of moral disengagement for the occurrence of unethical behaviour. Of course, this 
should not be interpreted in a way that creating strong situations per se is sufficient to prevent 
unethical behaviour in organizations. If employees’ tendency to engage in (un)ethical 
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behaviour is influenced by situational strength, then the kind of behaviour which is 
channelled through strong situations depends on the signals provided by the context in which 
the decision is made. If employees perceive the situation in a way that the unethical 
behaviour is the appropriate choice, then situational strength should increase unethical 
behaviour. Even more interesting but yet to be examined, our findings might have 
implications for the possibility that strong ethical infrastructures might not be sufficient to 
prevent some forms of unethical behaviour, namely unethical behaviours that are not 
explicitly recognized as such (Martin et al., 2014). Examining employees’ perceived 
situational strength in combination with moral issues might be way to discover which 
behaviours are seen as unethical and whether ethical infrastructures provide a sufficient 
impetus not to show these behaviours. 
Furthermore, strong applied situations may be rare in contemporary contexts in which 
employee uncertainty (Parker, Neal & Griffin, 2007) and managerial discretion (i.e., the 
latitude of action or control over how one does one’s work; Caza, 2012; Hambrick & 
Finkelstein, 1987) are increasing on every hierarchical level (Hambrick, Finkelstein, Cho, & 
Jackson, 2005). Our findings suggest that a twofold strategy may be beneficial. First, it seems 
important that those who have the chance to influence sensemaking in organizations make 
moral issues salient to individuals who are granted greater discretion. That is, they need to be 
moral managers (Brown & Trevino, 2006) as well as managers of decision processes 
(Bazerman & Gino, 2012). Second, if it is not possible to create strong situations that favour 
ethical behaviour in organizations, our findings suggest that emphasis could be put on 
selecting employees with particular personal strengths and/or nurturing and encouraging such 
characteristics. Our findings with respect to the effects of moral disengagement on unethical 
behaviour provide one example for an individual difference that might be particularly 
influential in weak situations. However, the negative correlation between moral 
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disengagement and perceived ethical norm violation indicates that individuals high on moral 
disengagement are less sensitive in detecting moral issues in strong situations as well. Moral 
sensitivity training might be particularly beneficial for such individuals, helping them to 
recognize the moral issues implicit in some situations. Whether this perception effect 
manifests in unethical behaviour, however, seems to depend on situational strength. 
Finally, although our research will not resolve the debate of whether authenticity is 
necessarily related to ethical behaviour (Algera & Lips-Wiersma, 2012; Shamir & Eilam, 
2005), it illustrates one path through which authenticity may be translated into ethical 
choices. Our research suggests that people high in authenticity might have a lower propensity 
to morally disengage which in the end reduces their tendency to engage in unethical 
behaviour. These findings support approaches that emphasized the role of consistent self-
expression and self-awareness for the occurrence of (un)ethical behaviour (Blasi, 1980; Pitesa 
& Thau, 2013). Notably, authenticity was negatively related to unethical behaviour in strong 
situations which might be due to their higher sensitivity to ethical issues in strong situations 
(as indicated by the positive correlation between authenticity and perceived ethical norm 
violation). We interpret these effects in a way that moral disengagement mediates the effect 
of authenticity on unethical behaviour in weak situations, only, as these situations provide 
more room for moral disengagement to occur. 
Limitations and directions for future research 
Applying the situational strength hypothesis to understand the differing influence of 
individual differences on moral behaviour resulted from an evolving research process. 
Although we could confirm some of our post-hoc explanations of our Study 1 through the 
findings in Study 2 (e.g., by providing support for our categorization of the four original 
moral issues according to their strength using a direct measure of situational strength 
perception), other points were not entirely solved and some new issues arose.   Nevertheless, 
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our intention to understand unethical behaviour as a function of both individual differences 
and situational strength became more developed. We address some of the methodological and 
conceptual limitations in the following paragraphs. 
A primary methodological limitation is that we assessed only a limited range of 
unethical behavior. We drew upon a set of moral issues that has been used in prior research 
(Petersen & Dietz, 2000, 2008) and we extended the scope of behaviours in our second study. 
However, a more systematically selected set of situations is needed. Future research could 
select situations according to criteria that have been shown to influence the tendency to 
engage in unethical behaviour such as magnitude of consequences, probability of the effect, 
and proximity to the victim of the unethical behaviour (Jones, 1991; Kish-Gephart et al., 
2010).  
Considering these characteristics when selecting moral issues in experiments or when 
categorizing immoral behaviour in real world settings might also help overcoming anomalies 
in our findings. For example, although there is a match between our perceived situational 
strength measure and statistical indicators for behavioural variance with dichotomous 
responses (e.g., low mean scores and standard deviations), this is not as clear as expected. 
Although strong and weak situations may be opposite ends of a conceptual continuum, people 
respond to patterns of attributes in a stimuli, and those aspects may be separate from the 
designation as strong or weak situations with some aspects being shared by items for strong 
and others for weak situations. For example, our situational strength measure is an explicit 
assessment of situations by subjects. Behaviour does not always follow from assessments, 
and there are explicit as well as implicit components to behaviour. As shown for example in 
the work by Haidt (for an overview, see Haidt & Kesebir, 2010), (im)moral behaviour 
sometimes follows from immediate emotional impulses and people have great difficulties to 
explain why they decided in a particular way. Thus, an item could be assessed a weak 
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situation in terms of conscious perceptions, but implicit aspects of the item might lead people 
to consistently respond one way or another. It is the problem attributes that promote 
behaviors, not the classification as strong or weak situations, which is an interpretation 
provided by researchers trying to build more abstract concepts to understand behavior. Thus, 
there is no necessary mapping between the conceptual dimension and what is shared among 
attributes which could be unidimensional, bi dimensional, etc. What is empirically interesting 
is the clear separation of situations into groups. Further research needs to look at what aspects 
of situations prompt such a dimensional structure. 
Another methodological limitation is that our research is based on self-reports or 
intended moral behaviour. Studies that include informant reports or allow for the observation 
of actual moral behaviour would be useful to further confirm our findings. We cannot rule out 
that participants would act differently when they give instructions to the followers they 
supervise in their daily job. However, there is evidence (see Bartol & Martin, 1990) that in-
basket exercises can realistically simulate the actual decision making environments of 
managers which might be one reason for their use in personnel selection procedures, and we 
tried to minimize biases by including items with differing moral content along with filler 
tasks into the in-basket exercise. We also framed the exercise as examining manager 
performance rather than as a study on moral behaviour. Future studies could use the 
situational strength measure that we developed and examine the Situational Strength 
Hypothesis in real-world settings. Such work should also examine the influence of the 
situation, person, and their interplay in the emergence of a broader range of unethical 
behaviours.  
On a more conceptual note, we suggest that the relationship between authenticity and 
moral disengagement deserves more research attention. Our mediation model is based on the 
assumption that more general processes of the self (i.e., the striving for self-understanding 
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and consistent self-expression) have an indirect effect on the tendency to engage in unethical 
behaviour operating through more proximal antecedents of unethical behaviour. Given the 
nature of the processes that are summarized under the two concepts, we expected that moral 
disengagement is the proximal/direct antecedent of unethical behaviour whereas 
authenticity’s effect operates more in a more distal/indirect manner. However, based merely 
on the design of our study, we cannot assess the causal relation among these two variables. 
Given that both individual characteristics are seen as malleable to some extent (Bandura, 
1999; Knoll et al., 2015), longitudinal research is needed to investigate causality between 
authenticity and moral disengagement.  
Besides these expected long-term effects, both authenticity and moral disengagement 
have been suggested to vary across situations (Martin et al., 2015; Sheldon, Ryan, 
Rawsthorne & Ilardi, 1997). This view is more established for moral disengagement which 
originally has been treated as a state which is triggered by specific features of the situation 
(e.g., the existence of an authority figure allows for denying responsibility). However, there is 
evidence that more general self-relevant processes such as those associated with authenticity 
also vary across situations (e.g., depending on the role one embodies; Sheldon et al., 1997). 
Future research using more than one measuring point could examine whether moral 
disengagement increases during the in-basket exercise (compared to a baseline measure prior 
to the experiment). We can even think of a moderator relationship where moral 
disengagement increases for those low in authenticity only. Although we think that 
authenticity and moral disengagement are closely related and that authentic individuals are 
less likely to morally disengage, this relationship deserves further empirical evaluation.  
Our research might help determine which situational characteristics influence the 
fluctuation in authenticity and moral disengagement. For example, moral disengagement 
seems particularly relevant as a proximal antecedent of unethical behaviour in rather 
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ambiguous situations; however, it has also been argued to increase employees’ tendency to 
engage in unethical behaviour when strong ethical infrastructures are given (Martin et al., 
2014). More research linking situational strength to unethical behaviour could also integrate a 
broader range of theoretical approaches that are relevant for understanding unethical 
behaviour. For example, proponents of Cognitive Dissonance Theory (Festinger, 1957) could 
argue that people after making unethical decisions might justify their behaviour by 
interpreting the situation in a way that relieves them from negative moral emotions such as 
guilt and shame. For example, employees could argue that they conducted unethical 
behaviour to benefit the organization (Umphress & Bingham, 2011). Considering classical 
ideas such as the Cognitive Dissonance Theory might lead to parsimonious explanations of 
unethical behaviour and the Situational Strength Hypotheses might explain when dissonance 
(reduction) is likely. 
Conclusion 
Prior research suggests three main influences on unethical behaviour: individual 
differences, environmental differences, and differences in moral issues (Kish-Gephardt et al., 
2010). Our research supports this view and provides an approach that might be able to 
integrate these three influences. We showed that moral disengagement and authenticity 
function as predictors of unethical behaviour, but that these effects were influenced by 
situational characteristics as suggested by the Situational Strength Hypothesis (Mischel, 
1977). Authenticity was related to unethical behaviour in strong situations but showed only 
an indirect effect through moral disengagement on unethical behaviour in weak situations. 
This finding might help clarifying a controversial area in leadership research where 
authenticity is associated with moral managers. Moral disengagement, in turn, influences 
unethical behaviour (directly and as a mediator) in weak situations, only. The Situational 
Strength Hypothesis seems intuitively compelling. However, despite being widely used as a 
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metaphor and operationalized via proxies (e.g., Meyer, Dalal, & Hermida, 2010), studies 
which directly test the hypotheses are scarce and little reliable knowledge is available on 
when people experience a situation as strong or weak and why. Our studies are only a first 
step that may encourage further exploration of the situational strength hypothesis in 
behavioural ethics research. Future research might draw upon our findings and our research 
model to enrich knowledge about the processes linking strong/weak situations and unethical 
behaviour. It might also examine how the nature of the situation and the moral issue 
influences when individual differences cause unethical behaviour in organizations. 
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Table 1. Means, standard deviations, and zero-order correlations of Study 1 (upper diagonal) and Study 2 (lower diagonal) variables 
  M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 M SD 
1 Age 31.61 8.95 - -.06 -.22** .14* -.00 -.07 -.03 32.75 8.99 
2 Gender 1.71 0.45 -.04 - -.23** .02 .05 .06 .07 1.84 0.38 
3 Moral Disengagement  2.48 0.82 -.17** -.25** - -.32** .19** .06 .19** 2.34 0.87 
4 Authenticity  4.83 0.78 .11 -.07 -.24** - -.13
†
 -.05 -.13
†
 3.88 0.53 
5 
Unethical Behaviour (weak 
situations)  
0.61 0.29 -.02 -.14* .26** .05 - .13
†
 .92** 0.62 0.26 
6 
Unethical Behaviour (strong 
situation)  
0.34 0.22 -.24** .01 .08 .13* .06 - .51** 0.14 0.35 
7 
Unethical Behaviour 
(composite measure)  
0.49 0.19 -.14* -.14* .29** -.05 .76** .58** - 0.50 0.22 
8 
Ethical norm violation 
(weak situations) 
5.35 1.32 -.15* .05 -.13* .03 -.22** .10 -.09 - - 
9 
Ethical norm violation 
(strong situations) 
5.66 1.25 -.00 -.14* -.15* .17* -.06 -.09 -.11 - - 
10 
Ethical norm violation 
(composite measure) 
5.56 1.06 -.08 -.05 -.17* .11 -.17* .02 -.11 - - 
Notes. N’s = 213 (Study 1) and 231 (Study 2). Gender: 1 = male, 2=female. Unethical behaviour: 0 = ethical choice, 1 = unethical choice. Composite measure of 
unethical behaviour included 4 items in Study 1 and seven items in Study 2. Weak situations in Study 1 and 2 are identically measured with three items. Strong 
situation(s) was measured with 1 item in Study 1 and 3 items in Study 2. The measure for whether the situation included an answer option that violate ethical 
norms (ethical nom violation) was included in Study 2, only. ** p < .01; * p < .05, † p < .10. 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics for situation items included in Study 2, situational strength, and 
unethical behaviour  
Moral Issue # Ethical Norm 
Violation 
Mean (SD) 
Illegal Response 
Option 
Mean (SD) 
Situational 
Strength 
Mean (SD) 
Unethical 
Behaviour  
Mean (SD) 
1* 5.33 (1.98) 3.56 (2.04) 4.09 (1.11) 0.64 (.48) 
2* 5.59 (1.64) 3.32 (2.08) 4.13 (1.04) 0.36 (.48) 
3* 5.13 (1.90) 2.46 (1.85) 4.04 (1.13) 0.83 (.38) 
4* 5.37 (1.87) 6.22 (1.42) 4.35 (1.35) 0.13 (.34) 
5 5.18 (1.79) 3.24 (2.06) 4.25 (1.18) 0.73 (.44) 
6 5.79 (1.67) 6.04 (1.50) 4.16 (1.22) 0.57 (.50) 
7 6.38 (1.33) 5.83 (1.70) 4.99 (1.39) 0.16 (.36) 
Note. N = 231. Order of situations as presented to the participants in Study 2: Filler(=F)1, Moral 
issue(=M)1, F2, M2, M3, F3, M4, M5, M6, F4, M7. The asterisk indicates moral issues that were also in Study 
1. 
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Table 3. Summary of exploratory factor analysis results for the situational strength measure 
 Rotated Factor  Loadings 
Moral Issue # 1 (Strong Situation) 2 (Weak Situation) 
5* .94 -.09 
4* .58 .14 
7* .35 .15 
2* -.05 .75 
3* .18 .51 
6 .33 .43 
1* .05 .37 
Eigenvalues 3.27 0.88 
% of variance 39.56 4.34 
Note. N = 231. The asterisk indicates items that were selected to represent strong and weak 
situations in the subsequent analyses. 
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Figure 1. Theoretical model. 
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Note. Superscripts indicate Study 1 and Study 2 values. The indirect effect from authenticity to unethical behaviour via moral disengagement 
for Study 1 was -.05 (SE = .03), p = .03, and for Study 2 it was -.07 (SE = .02), p < .01. N’s were 213 for Study 1 and 231 for Study 2. ** p < .01; * 
p < .05 
 
Figure 2. Mediation results. Standardized effects are shown for Study 1 and Study 2.  
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Note. Standardized effects are shown. The indirect effect from authenticity to unethical behaviour via moral disengagement for weak 
situations was -.07 (SE = .03), p = .01, and for strong situations it was -.01 (SE = .02), p > .50. * p < .05 
 
Figure 3. Moderation model results. 
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